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A conceptual framework for physical security culture in organisations is proposed, based on the 
integrative model of safety culture, as developed by Vierendeels et al. (2018). The proposed 
conceptual framework for physical security culture has the advantage that it brings security threats, 
technique, organisation and human aspects together in a coherent, integrative and related way. The 
framework includes five main domains of security culture, being (1) an observable technological 
domain, (2) an observable organisational domain, (3) an observable human domain, (4) a non-
observable organisational domain or perceptual domain, and (5) a non-observable human domain or 
psychological domain. These five main domains can be further divided into several more specific 
sub-domains of security culture. At their turn, these sub-domains can be translated into measurable 
security results, being (1) observable security outcomes, (2) the security climate of an organisation or 
the shared perceptions on security, and (3) the individual intention to behave secure or insecure. The 
aim of the framework is to take all security-related aspects into account – based on the specific 
security threats to which an organisation is exposed – leading to a pro-active approach of the physical 
security of organisations. The framework provides specific points of departure to make the security 
culture measurable, and by extension controllable. 
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1. Introduction  
The field of academic research in the domain of security is relatively new. Only since the 
beginning of this century, attention for security has been translated into scientific research, 
with a huge boost in studies since 9/11. From then on, more and more security initiatives 
have been emerged in both science and practice. Due to the relative young status of security 
research, conceptual frameworks, theories, and models are still fully developing. An 
advantage in this ongoing development process, is the resemblance of security with safety, 
causing that inspiration for security research can be found in the field of safety research, of 
which the latter has a longer academic history. 
In this paper, a conceptual framework for physical security culture in organisations is 
proposed, based on the integrative model of safety culture, as developed by Vierendeels et 
al. (2018). The safety culture model of Vierendeels et al. (2018) is called The Egg 
Aggregated Model (TEAM) of safety culture, and is developed based on an extensive 
review of literature regarding existing studies and models with respect to safety.  
 
2. Main resemblances and differences between safety and security 
For a long time, security and safety were seen as independent from each other. Though, 
more recent research illustrates that there arises synergy when safety and security measures 
are considered jointly. Much can be learned from adopting the knowledge of the one 
discipline to the other and vice versa (Kria et al., 2015).  
The main resemblance between safety and security is the focus on preventing undesirable 
events such as injury to people, material damage and environmental damage. The main 
difference is the origin of these undesirable events, being unintentional in the field of 
safety, and intentional in the field of security.  
This difference in origin leads to an important distinction in the desired degree of 
transparency. In the field of safety, a high level of transparency – both within and outside 
organisations – is required in order to optimally prevent undesirable safety events and in 
order to optimally come to insights and learn from each other. However, in the field of 
security, this transparency is also needed, but only within trusted communities, for instance 
within a single plant or between multiple plants of the same organisation. Outside these 
trusted communities, the level of transparency should be curtailed in order to optimally 
prevent undesirable security events and to protect (sensitive) information. This can be 
clarified by, for example, storage tanks of chemical products. Safety-wise, the 
characteristics of the stored chemicals should be easily retrievable in case of for instance a 
leak or a fire. However, security-wise, the retrievability of the chemical characteristics 
makes it easier to choose a target in case of for instance theft or a terrorist attack. Therefore, 
this information should only be shared within the trusted community, for instance with the 
nearest fire department.  
Another distinction relates to the difference between risks in the domain of safety, and 
threats in the field of security. Safety risks are predominantly rooted inside the 
organisation, whereas security threats are mostly rooted outside of the organisation. Safety 
risks are often well-known by the organisation, as the accident scenarios are inherently 
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linked to the specific characteristics of the organisation. However, looking at security, it is 
more difficult to fully cover the specific threats to which an organisation is exposed, as this 
could cover a wide spectrum of possible scenarios that are influenced by aspects out of the 
control or knowledge of an organisation (Jore, 2017). 
A noteworthy resemblance is that both safety and security can be viewed as a part of the 
overall organisational culture (Hopkins, 2006; Connolly, 2000). This implies that both 
safety and security should be integrated in other corporate processes. Doing so, in order to 
be as efficient and effective as possible, both safety and security should be assessed in an 
integrative, holistic way. In other words, continuous attention is needed for both the safety 
culture and the security culture of an organisation. 
 
3. The need for a proactive and integrative approach of security culture 
Organisations – and even governances – are approaching their security in a predominantly 
reactive manner which is incident-driven, instead of using a more proactive approach 
(Ruighaver et al., 2007). Also, based on the literature, it can be concluded that security 
research often lacks an integrative approach. After all, it are mainly the technological 
security aspects that receive attention. It is only in the last decade that the concept of 
security culture gains interest from researchers and business leaders,  with a dominant 
position of information/cyber security. There is nearly no reference to other types of 
security issues. However, in analogy with safety culture, a proactive and holistic approach 
is needed when addressing the security culture of an organisation. 
As elaborated in the safety culture model of Vierendeels et al. (2018), safety culture 
consists of three main domains, being a technological, an organisational and a human 
domain. This approach can be extended to the field of security culture, where security 
culture consists of three main domains: 
(1) A technological domain, which comprises aspects regarding the present security 
technology, material and equipment present in the company. 
(2) An organisational domain, which comprises aspects such as the security management, 
the company security policy, and the resources available for security. 
(3) A human domain, which comprises aspects such as knowledge, attitudes, assumptions, 
decisions, and actions of individuals regarding security.  
Both the organisational and the human domain are manifested at two levels: 
(1) Firstly, there are the tangible, observable aspects regarding security. These are the 
aspects that are observable when walking around in the company. This concerns, for 
instance, the security behaviour of employees, or the security rules, procedures, 
instructions, etc. that can be consulted in documents of the company. 
(2) Secondly, there are the less tangible, non-observable aspects. These are the aspects 
that cannot be observed by walking around in a company. This concerns, for instance, 
what employees think of the level of security in the company, or the attitude they have 
towards security.  
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The technological domain consists only of observable aspects. This structure leads to five 
domains, as can be seen in Figure 1, which together form the physical security culture of an 
organisation. The five domains can be further divided into several sub-domains, which are 
represented as the white boxes in Figure 1. Important are the arrows in the model, which 
symbolise that all the different domains of the physical security culture are related in a 
cyclic way. 
The grey boxes in the conceptual model represent the security results. In case of the three 
observable domains, the several sub-domains result in observable security outcomes. In 
case of the non-observable organisational domain or the perceptual domain, the several sub-
domains result in the security climate of an organisation, being the shared perceptions on 
security. In case of the non-observable human domain or the psychological domain, the 
several sub-domains result in the individual intention to behave secure or insecure.  
The security culture of a specific organisation is influenced by external factors such as the 
level of technological development of a country or a region, the socio-economic status of a 
country or a region, the policies, regulations and legislations of a country or a region, the 
national culture, etcetera. In addition, the security culture of an organisation is inextricably 
linked to the security threats to which a specific organisation is exposed to. In other words, 
the entire security culture of an organisation – security results included – is influenced by 
the specific security threats of the organisation.  For instance, in the financial sector, the 
security threats of espionage, fraud and theft are more prominent than for instance in the 
chemical sector where the security threats of terrorism and activism are more prominent. 
The presence of these possible security threats influence the entire development and rollout 
of the security culture of the organisation.  
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PERCEPTIONS ON: 
Organisational security priorities 
Dealing with security incidents 
Management commitment towards security 
Supporting security environment 
Security responsibilities 
Security communication & transparency 
Trust in the organisation 
… 
Individual attitudes towards security 
Security knowledge 
Personal security priorities 
… 
Security technology 
Security equipment & material 
… 
Resources for security 
Security policy 
Security communication Security performance 
Security procedures 
Communication and transparency (within 
trusted communities) 
… 
Security behaviour 
Security education & training (skills & abilities) 
… 
OBSERVABLE SECURITY OUTCOMES 
SECURITY CLIMATE  
(shared perceptions on security) 
INDIVIDUAL INTENTION TO BEHAVE (UN)SECURE 
                       
                       
 
Domain of security culture 
 
Sub-domain of security culture 
 
Security result 
SECURITY THREATS 
Espionage, murder, fraud, aggression, sabotage, 
activism, terrorism, theft, vandalism,… 
External factors 
Technological development, socio-economic status, policies, 
regulations, legislation, the national culture, political situation,… 
Fig. 1. An integrative conceptual framework for physical security culture in organisations 
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4. Addressing the security culture of an organisation 
To address the physical security culture of an organisation, several steps should be taken as 
illustrated in Figure 2. Firstly, the security culture should be diagnosed. In order to obtain a 
clear image of the current physical security culture in the organisation, all sub-domains 
constituting physical security culture should be measured. 
Subsequently, based on this measurement, recommendations should be formulated and 
implemented in order to improve the current physical security culture (van Nunen et al., 
2016). It is important that continuous attention is being paid to the security of a company. 
Follow-up is needed in order to meet with possible changes within the company as well as 
external developments and trends in the field of security. It is an everlasting process, a 
cycle of evaluation and maintenance or change. 
During this continuous process of addressing security culture, some aspects should be taken 
into account, in analogy with addressing safety culture (van Nunen et al., 2016). It is for 
instance important to use a multi-method approach in order to adequately explore and 
understand the security culture of an organisation. Also, the involvement of the entire 
organisation is important. Employees, supervisors, managers, contractors, clients, suppliers, 
etcetera; all should be taken into account when diagnosing the security culture. This 
comprehensive involvement is not only crucial during the diagnose of the security culture, 
but also during the phase of formulating improvement strategies and setting priorities. Not 
only leads this comprehensive involvement to a more accurate diagnose of the security 
culture, it also leads to the creation of a foundation to successfully implement and maintain 
the improvement strategies. 
 
Fig. 2. Addressing physical security culture (adapted from van Nunen et al., 2016) 
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5. Conclusion 
The proposed conceptual framework for physical security culture in organisations has the 
advantage that it brings technique, organisation and human together in a coherent, 
integrative and related way. The aim of the framework is to take all security-related aspects 
into account, leading to a pro-active approach of the physical security, instead of working 
on an incident-driven base. The framework provides specific points of departure to make 
the security culture measurable, and by extension controllable. The importance of 
continuous attention for security is being stressed, as well as the importance of the 
involvement of the entire organisation in order to obtain sustainable improvements in the 
field of security.  
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